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Many victims were killed, and in fact one of us had to 
carry the head of her dead husband from Nakuru so that 
she could bury it. Her husband was killed during PEV. Do 
you know how traumatizing that is? Another lady’s 
husband was killed in their house. These women are 
suffering and their only hope was the ICC. You are now 
informing us that the case has been terminated, do you 
want us to kill ourselves also? (Halafu unatuambia case 
imeisha, unataka hata sisi tujiue?) 
… 
Will the Court at least allow us to give our opinions in 
regards to this termination? There is so much we have to 




The independence of the Prosecutor was one of the most contentious issues to be canvassed at the 
Rome Conference, leading up to the adoption of the International Criminal Court Statute.3 Some 
States were worried about the prospect of an overly strong, independent prosecutor, and felt the 
need to put in place a series of checks and balances to avoid what might be perceived as the 
overzealousness of prosecutorial action. Other States, many civil society representatives and 
some academics were concerned that putting in place too many checks would turn the Court into 
a political instrument which would act and react in accordance with political as opposed to legal 
objectives, and would become a disservice to the overall aim of ending impunity.   
  
The ICC Statute produced an inevitable balance – the independence of the Prosecutor is 
preserved, subject to a number of legal (as opposed to political) checks and balances. This has 
allowed the Prosecutor to engage in a number of sensitive preliminary examinations, 
investigations and prosecutions. But the practice of the Court has revealed another challenge; one 
which was perhaps less anticipated. This is the converse problem of (real or perceived) lack of 
zeal. What sway, if any, should there be to press what some might perceive to be a ‘reluctant’ 
prosecutor to take on more? What role for victims affected by the crimes under the jurisdiction of 
the Court, their lawyers and the many civil society groups that are working with them? 
 
Article 54(1) of the Statute requires the Prosecutor to ‘establish the truth, extend the investigation 
to cover all facts and evidence relevant to an assessment of whether there is criminal 
responsibility’, and ‘take appropriate measures to ensure the effective investigation and 
prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.’ Yet, how to measure ‘effectiveness’ is 
not clearly set out in the Statute, and even if it was clear, or indeed if the well-defined principle of 
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effectiveness under human rights law was applied,
4
 there is no real procedure under the ICC Statute to 
ensure this happens.  
 
The context of course is complicated. The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) does not have the resources 
to prosecute all the individuals involved in the perpetration of massive crimes, nor is it capable of 
simultaneously investigating each and every crime falling within the ICC’s jurisdiction.The 
Prosecutor has limited personnel and budgetary capacity. Security and lack of cooperation constraints 
have impeded some investigations, which has led to evidential weaknesses in several cases brought to 
the Court. Clearly there is little room for the Prosecutor to manoeuvre. But at the same time, if there is 
a Prosecutor and a Court in place, and there are States Parties that have acceded to the ICC Statute 
and thus agreed to be bound by the ICC system, there is – and indeed there should be - a certain 
expectation that when the Court has jurisdiction, the Prosecutor will duly investigate and lodge 
prosecutions in relation to crimes coming within that jurisdiction, at least the ‘worst’ ones.  
 
The Preamble of the ICC Statute emphasises that ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole must not go unpunished…’ and that the overriding purpose of the 
ICC’s establishment is to ‘put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to 
contribute to the prevention of such crimes.’ Indeed, at least for ‘the most serious crimes’, the 
Prosecutor is duty-bound to analyse the information received on potential crimes in order to determine 




In domestic law, there are rules and standards that apply. In some countries, there will be guidelines 
about how a Prosecutor exercises discretion, and victims can complain when these aren’t followed. In 
other countries, there is a prosecutorial obligation to institute proceedings when the evidence is 
sufficient.
6
 Under international human rights law, there is an obligation on States to investigate and 
prosecute the most serious human rights abuses which constitute crimes under international law
7
 and 




Arguably, there is no reason why this duty of States to investigate and prosecute crimes under 
international law is not reflected even in some modified way in the ICC Prosecutor’s duties and 
responsibilities, as some form of presumption,9 or serving as ‘a factor for consideration in the 
exercise of discretion.’10 After all, it is many of these same crimes under international law over 
which the ICC has jurisdiction, when States Parties fail to proceed genuinely with investigations or 
prosecutions. The ICC system as a whole is designed to avoid impunity and ensuring a modicum of 
action by the Prosecutor in furtherance of this aim, seems wholly appropriate and necessary. But, the 
inability for the Prosecutor to pursue all cases which fall within its mandate, given the sheer volume 
of grave situations and cases arguably necessitates a different kind of approach.  
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 As many have argued,
11
 it is vital for the Prosecutor to have a clear and objective policy from which it 
faithfully takes its decisions. This will enhance transparency and accountability when the Prosecutor 
inevitably chooses to take on one case over another and will help to clarify to all who look to the ICC 
as the appropriate venue to pursue international crimes prosecutions, the types of cases which will 
engender the attention of the Prosecutor. Judicial review of discretion is a further means by which 
transparency can be assured. As indicated by Nsereko, there is ‘a need to put in place mechanisms and 
practices to minimize error or to check abuse. This is the more necessary because, … a wrong 
decision by the prosecutor, particularly to prosecute or not to prosecute, has the potential to erode 
public confidence in his or her office and in the administration of justice. Enhancing transparency and 
accountability in the prosecutor’s decision-making process is a major way of minimizing and 
checking abuse.’12 Judicial review would be consistent with certain domestic jurisdictions, and could 
provide ‘a means by which persons affected by a case, particularly victims, can seek redress against 
decisions by the prosecutor’.13 
 
But to date, there is no such framework. The Prosecutor has carefully guarded its independence 
and thus far has only introduced very generalised policy frameworks which provide little 
guidance to observers and the Pre-Trial Chamber has so far been extremely deferential to the 
Prosecutor’s exercise of discretion. Victims and others concerned by certain actions or non-
actions of the Prosecution have had little occasion to express those concerns, despite the ICC’s 
celebrated victim participation framework.  
 
It is this gap between the expectations of justice and what happens in practice which is the 
background to this article, and in particular, what can be done and by whom to press the 
Prosecution to act when it is reluctant to do so. I argue that the relevant Pre-Trial Chamber should 
be prepared to provide real oversight over the exercise of prosecutorial discretion; undue 
deference to the Prosecutor will not always be helpful to the attainment of justice for the worst 
crimes, nor to the eradication of impunity. I also argue that victims whose interests are affected 
should be accorded greater access to the Court to express their concerns, and that these views 
should necessarily be taken into greater account in decisions whether to proceed with an 
investigation or prosecution. At present, victims’ procedural rights in this area are rigorously 
curtailed. As will be described, part of the considerations which must be taken into account when 
deciding not to proceed with an investigation or prosecution involves an assessment of ‘the 
interests of justice’ and the ‘interests of victims’. In order to make these assessments, I argue that 
victims’ unfiltered voices should be heard by the Court.   
II. The Statutory Framework 
The ICC Statute provides different approaches to how an investigation and prosecution can be 
commenced or closed down, depending on how the matter has come before the Court in the first 
place. In accordance with Article 13 of the Statute, a matter can come before the Court in three 
principle ways: i) the Prosecutor can initiate a preliminary examination on her own initiative 
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acting upon her proprio motu powers; ii) a State Party may refer a matter to the Prosecutor; or iii) 
the UN Security Council may refer a matter.  
 
When the Prosecutor is acting on her proprio motu powers and has commenced a preliminary 
examination on that basis, if she thereafter determines that there is a ‘reasonable basis’ to proceed 
with an investigation she is then required to obtain authorisation from the Pre-Trial Chamber in 
accordance with Article 15(3) of the Statute. In contrast, when a situation has been triggered as a 
result of a State Party or Security Council referral, there is no need to obtain advance authorization 
from the Pre-Trial Chamber to open an investigation. 
 
However, the Prosecutor may thereafter determine that she does not wish to proceed with an 
investigation or a later prosecution. This might be because of the Prosecutor’s belief that there is no 
discernable admissible crime, that the matter would be inadmissible due to reasons of 
complementary,  and/or because the identified crimes are not sufficiently serious to warrant the 
commencement of an investigation.14 If the Prosecutor decides not to proceed, the Statute sets out a 
number of factors to be taken into account, and affords rights to certain parties. First, the Prosecutor is 
obligated to inform the relevant Chamber of this decision. The Prosecutor is also required to inform 
those who provided the office with information,
15
 and particularly victims.
16 
 
If the matter was initiated by a State Party or a UN Security Council referral, then those bodies have 
the right to seek review of the Prosecutor’s decision not to proceed, before the Pre-Trial Chamber. 
Victims affected by the Prosecutor’s decision have no comparable rights, though they may be 
accorded the right to participate in review proceedings initiated by others.  The Pre-Trial Chamber can 
request the Prosecutor to reconsider her decision not to proceed, but ultimately the discretion lies with 
the Prosecutor to determine what cases to pursue.  
 
The Prosecutor may also take the decision not to proceed on the basis of the ‘interests of justice’. The 
Statute provides that when the Prosecutor is satisfied that there is a reasonable basis to believe that the 
case is within the jurisdiction of the Court and would be admissible, she can nevertheless decide not 
to proceed when, ‘taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of the victims, there 
are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of 
justice.’17 Similarly, Article 53(2) addresses the ability of the prosecutor to forego a prosecution. It 
indicates that, upon investigation, the Prosecutor may conclude that there is not a sufficient basis to 
proceed because it ‘is not in the interests of justice, taking into account all the circumstances, 
including the gravity of the crime, the interests of victims and the age or infirmity of the alleged 
perpetrators, and his or her role in the alleged crime.’  
 
If either of those determinations is made, the Prosecutor must notify the Pre-Trial Chamber to that 
effect with reasons for her determination. The Pre-Trial Chamber can review the Prosecutor’s 
decision on the ‘interests of justice’ of its own motion.18 Upon that review, should the Pre-Trial 
Chamber disagree with the Prosecutor’s assessment, it can order the Prosecutor to proceed with the 
investigation or prosecution. The powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber are greater in such contexts. If the 
Pre-Trial Chamber decides to review the Prosecutor’s decision then it will only be effective if 
confirmed by the Chamber. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence make clear that when the Pre-Trial 
Chamber does not confirm the Prosecutor’s decision not to proceed, ‘he or she shall proceed with the 
investigation or prosecution’ (emphasis added).19  
 
The Prosecutor can also itself reconsider a decision not to investigate or prosecute, on the basis of 
new facts or information, regardless of whether a request to do so has emanated from the Pre-Trial 
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Chamber. As such, it is always possible for victims’ groups, civil society organisations, States Parties 
and others to supply additional facts and evidence to the Prosecutor to encourage her to revisit an 
earlier negative decision.   
III. Prosecutorial Discretion and the Development of Guidelines 
In light of extensive powers of the Prosecutor to decide which situations and cases to pursue, and 
which charges (if any) to proffer, there have been calls on the Prosecutor to develop guidelines on the 
exercise of its discretion.
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 Thus, the Office of the Prosecutor has released a series of policy papers 
which, while falling short of formal guidelines, help to clarify how the Prosecutor understands its 
discretion and purports to exercise it. The Office’s approach to discretion can be further understood 
through its submissions and pleadings in cases before the Court. As will be described, the various 
statements of principle are broadly framed, leaving quite a lot of room for manoeuvre. Furthermore, 
there is little ability to hold the Prosecutor to these statements of principle. Indeed, some 
commentators have argued that they have been only selectively applied by the Prosecutor if at all, 
Schabas going so far as to refer to the Prosecutor’s  ‘interpretive deviations’ which he says may have 
the result of ‘distorting the proper role of the ICC in the campaign against impunity and the protection 
of human rights.’21  
The Prosecutor’s statements of policy which have included considerations of prosecutorial discretion 
have naturally evolved over time. The first of these was released in 2003: ‘Paper on some policy 
issues before the Office of the Prosecutor’.22 In this paper, the Prosecutor makes clear that given its 
limited resources, it will focus on initiating ‘prosecutions of the leaders who bear most responsibility 
for the crimes.’23 In the Annex to the Paper, it is made clear that the Prosecutor will ‘set priorities, 
taking into account the limits and requirements set out in the Statute, the general policy of the Office 
and all other relevant circumstances, including the feasibility of conducting an effective investigation 
in a particular territory.’24  
 
In later papers, the Prosecutor has clarified that its ‘policy of focused investigations and prosecutions’ 
‘means it will investigate and prosecute those who bear the greatest responsibility for the most serious 
crimes, based on the evidence that emerges during the course of an investigation. Part of the analysis 
to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed concerns the gravity of the crimes,
25
 which 
the Prosecutor has assessed to include ‘the scale, nature, and manner of commission of the crimes, and 
their impact, bearing in mind the potential cases that would be likely to arise from an investigation of 
the situation,’26 having regard to both quantitative and qualitative considerations.27 A limited number 
of incidents will be selected in order to allow the Office to carry out short investigations; to limit the 
number of persons put at risk by reason of their interaction with the Office; and to propose 
expeditious trials while aiming to represent the entire range of victimization.’28  
 
In its 2012-2015 strategic plan, the approach was changed. Prosecutor Ocampo’s policy of focused 
investigations and prosecutions has shifted under Bensouda to ‘open-ended, in-depth investigations’, 
‘towards a “building upwards” strategy where culpability of the most responsible persons could not be 
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sufficiently proven from the outset….’29 This has been explained to entail first identifying ‘alleged 
crimes (or incidents) to be investigated within a wide range of incidents. Following this meticulous 
process, alleged perpetrators are identified based on the evidence collected. This approach implies the 
need to consider multiple alternative case hypotheses and to consistently and objectively test case 
theories against the evidence – incriminating and exonerating – and to support decision-making in 
relation to investigations and prosecutions.’30  
 
Prosecutor Bensouda’s office has indicated that it is developing a case selection and case prioritisation 
policy to clarify how it decides which cases to pursue within a situation opened for investigation, as 
well as how it proposes to end its involvement on a situation under investigation.
31
 This will hopefully 
help to further improve the transparency of decision-making. 
 
IV. Practice before the Court 
IV.1 Preliminary Examinations 
The Prosecutor has received a vast number of communications since the office began to function. By 
the end of 2013, a total of 10,470 “communications” were received by the Office pursuant to article 
15 of the Statute.
32
 However, the majority of communications do not even reach the preliminary 
examination stage; they are filtered out because they are considered to be manifestly outside the 
jurisdiction of the Court.  
 
Neither the ICC Statute nor the Rules of Procedure and Evidence set a timeline for the Prosecutor to 
evaluate preliminary examinations. Rule 105of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence refers to the need 
for the Prosecutor to ‘promptly’ inform the State(s) or the Security Council making a referral, or in 
the case of decisions taken ‘in the interests of justice’, the Pre-Trial Chamber, when it decides not to 
proceed with an investigation. However, the promptness which is required arguably could relate to the 
timeframe beginning from the moment after the Prosecutor takes the decision to when it notifies of 
that decision, and not to the timeframe in which it takes the decision.
33
 Indeed, a number of 
preliminary examinations have languished for many years, without any final decision being taken by 
the Prosecutor.  
 
The Central African Republic which had referred a matter to the Prosecutor, sought to speed up the 
decision-making process by filing an application with the Pre-Trial Chamber, requesting the 
Prosecutor to provide information on the alleged failure to decide, within a reasonable time, whether 
or not to initiate an investigation.
34
 Citing a range of human rights standards concerning the need to 
proceed without unreasonable delay, the State noted the denial of justice for the victims and argued 
that the Prosecutor’s silence could be interpreted as an implicit refusal to open an investigation.35 This 
application led the Pre-Trial Chamber to affirm that ‘the preliminary examination of a situation 
pursuant to article 53 (1) of the Statute and rule 104 of the Rules must be completed within a 
reasonable time from the reception of a referral by a State Party under articles 13 (a) and 14 of the 
Statute, regardless of its complexity.’ 36 It then proceeded to request the Prosecutor, inter alia, ‘to 
provide the Chamber and the Government of the Central African Republic, no later than 15 December 
2006, with a report containing information on the current status of the preliminary examination of the 
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CAR situation, including an estimate of when the preliminary examination of the CAR situation will 
be concluded and when a decision pursuant to article 53 (1) of the Statute will be taken.’37 The 
Prosecutor complied with the request ‘in the interests of transparency’, but disputed that it had any 
specific obligation of timeliness in which to carry out preliminary examinations.
38
   
 
Of those situations that have proceeded to preliminary examination, eight have been revealed publicly 




There are only a few instances in which the Prosecutor has used its discretion not to proceed with an 
investigation. These are described below. Of these, there has been no instance in which the Prosecutor 
has taken a decision not to proceed solely on the basis of article 53, paragraph 1 (c) or 2 (c). As such 
the powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber to review the exercise of the Prosecutor’s discretion not to 
proceed have been circumscribed.
40
 The Venezuela and Republic of Korea matters concerned 
communications submitted directly to the Prosecutor under the proprio motu powers. In each case, the 
Prosecutor when applying Article 15, declined to seek authorisation to commence an investigation 
because of the view that the available information did not provide a reasonable basis to believe that a 
crime under the jurisdiction of the Statute was committed,
41
 at least in part having to do with the 
insufficient scale of the events. In the case of Venezuela, some of the information provided was 
understood to be too generalised and incapable of verification and the Prosecutor was not convinced 
that several particular acts were committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against any civilian population. With respect to the Republic of Korea, the rationale not to proceed 
appeared to be based on the difficulty to demonstrate that the anticipated civilian impact would have 
been clearly excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage of the attack. With respect to 
Iraq which also concerned the Prosecutor’s proprio motu powers, the Prosecutor came to an initial 
decision not to proceed with an investigation. Even though the Prosecutor determined that there was a 
reasonable basis to believe that crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court had been committed, 
namely wilful killing and inhuman treatment, the view taken was that the required gravity threshold of 
the Rome Statute had not been met.
42
 In assessing gravity, the Office appears to have focused solely 
on a quantitative analysis.
43
 It indicated that 
 
The Office considers various factors in assessing gravity. A key consideration is the number 
of victims of particularly serious crimes, such as wilful killing or rape. The number of 
potential victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court in this situation – 4 to 12 
victims of wilful killing and a limited number of victims of inhuman treatment – was of a 
different order than the number of victims found in other situations under investigation or 
analysis by the Office. It is worth bearing in mind that the OTP is currently investigating three 
situations involving long-running conflicts in Northern Uganda, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo and Darfur. Each of the three situations under investigation involves thousands of 
wilful killings as well as intentional and large-scale sexual violence and abductions.  
Collectively, they have resulted in the displacement of more than 5 million people. Other 
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44 OTP, ‘OTP response to communications received concerning Iraq’, pp 8-9. 
The preliminary examination concerning Iraq was later reopened after the receipt of additional 
information.
45
 The Prosecutor also opened a preliminary examination concerning Palestine in 
response to a declaration from the Minister of Justice of the Government of Palestine accepting the 
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court for acts committed on the territory of Palestine since 1 July 2002. 
However, it decided not to proceed because Palestine was not recognized as a State at the time of the 
declaration.
46
 The preliminary examination was later reopened as a result of the UN General 
Assembly having granted Palestine non-member observer status on 29 November 2012, and 
Palestine’s 2 January 2015 accession to the ICC Statute.47  
 
None of the above matters resulted in debate before the Pre-Trial Chamber because of the inability for 
the individuals who referred the information to the Prosecutor (who were not States or the UN 
Security Council, but mainly private persons and civil society organisations and in one instance – an 
entity that had not yet been recognized as a State) to seek review.    
 
IV.2 Pre-Trial Chamber Scrutiny: The Very Exceptional Mavi Marmara case 
 
The only instance in which the Pre-Trial Chamber has had occasion to review the exercise of the 
Prosecutor’s discretion not to initiate an investigation relates to the matter referred by the Union of the 
Comoros – concerning the Mavi Marmara flotilla, a vessel registered in the Comoros. The matter 
concerned the 31 May 2010 interception by Israeli Defense Forces of a humanitarian aid flotilla on 
route to the Gaza Strip, in which ten passengers were killed and more than 50 injured.  A preliminary 
examination was opened on 14 May 2013, and on 6 November 2014, the Prosecutor publicised its 
decision not to start an investigation.
48
 It indicated that even though there is a reasonable basis to 
believe that war crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court were committed, the Mavi Marmara, when 
Israeli Defense Forces intercepted the "Gaza Freedom Flotilla'' on 31 May 2010; ‘the potential case(s) 
likely arising from an investigation into this incident would not be of "sufficient gravity" to justify 
further action by the ICC.’49 In coming to this conclusion on the insufficient gravity, the Office of the 
Prosecutor distinguished the case from Abu Garda, which also concerned a single attack involving a 
relatively small number of victims, on the basis that Abu Garda concerned the killing of 
peacekeepers,
50
 thus placing the nature and the impact of the crimes in a different realm.  
 
Counsel for Comoros appealed, in accordance with Article 53(3)(a) of the ICC Statute, which permits 
the Pre-Trial Chamber to request the Prosecutor to reconsider her decision not to open an 
investigation. It argued that the way in which the Prosecutor applied the gravity threshold was 
erroneous, as were her assessment of what evidence could be considered and her assessment of that 
evidence. Among other rationales, Counsel for Comoros also argued that the Pre-Trial Chamber 
should be guided by the need to counter impunity for the crimes which would otherwise go 
unpunished, and the deterrent effect of an ICC investigation, when deciding whether to intervene to 
request the Prosecutor to reconsider her decision.
51
 The Legal Representative for Victims made 
similar arguments.
52
 The Prosecution in its observations strongly encouraged the Pre-Trial Chamber 
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to take a deferential approach in its assessment of the exercise by the Prosecutor of its discretion.  It 
submitted that:  
 
… although the Prosecution agrees that it must exercise its duties in a rational, fair, and 
reasonable way, the Pre-Trial Chamber should be reluctant to engage in its own comparisons 
of different situations before the Court in conducting any review. Likewise, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber should not interfere with the Prosecution’s assessment merely on the basis that the 
Judges have a “responsibility for upholding the underlying core values and principles of the 
ICC”, or to encourage deterrence. [footnotes omitted] 53 
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber accepted many of the arguments put forward by Comoros and the legal 





The Prosecutor has sought to appeal the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision,55 though the formal basis for 
so doing has been strongly contested.
56
 Its main arguments appear to be that the Pre-Trial Chamber 
exceeded its mandate under article 53(3) of the Statute, and the careful balance struck therein between 
prosecutorial independence and accountability.
57
 Indeed, the Prosecution seems to argue that it was 
wrong for the Pre-Trial Chamber to embark on a review of the Prosecutor’s assessment that certain 
facts did not meet the gravity threshold. It has argued that ‘Article 53(1) of the Statute does not permit 
the initiation of an investigation if the Prosecutor determines there is no reasonable basis to proceed. 
In this assessment, the Prosecutor is best placed to make the necessary determinations in accordance 
with the Statute.’58  
 
In observations made by the Office of Public Counsel for Victims, it was explained that ‘the filing of 
the Notice of Appeal has been perceived by the victims as a sign of unwillingness by the Prosecutor to 
listen to their concerns and to understand what really happened on board of the vessels.’59 Another 
team of legal representatives for victims, expressed that victims were ‘most disappointed’ highlighting 
‘the Prosecution showing no enthusiasm and urgency to investigate these crimes.’60 At the time of 
writing, this matter was still pending. 
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IV.3 Avoiding Pre-Trial Chamber Scrutiny 
Arguably, there have been at least two main avoidance techniques which have been employed 
by the Prosecution to avoid Pre-Trial Chamber scrutiny of prosecutorial discretion. The first 
concerns the practice of keeping examinations (and eventually investigations) open even though 
there does not appear to be an intention to proceed with an investigation or prosecution, without any 
formal decision being taken to close the investigation or prosecution and without ‘any indication of 
when, if ever, the investigation will resume.’61 
 
As already indicated, the Central African Republic argued that the Prosecutor’s failure to 
progress the preliminary examination of the situation without undue delay amounted to an 
implicit decision not to proceed. The Pre-Trial Chamber never addressed this contention in its 
ruling, and indeed with some further delay, the Prosecutor eventually did proceed with a full-
fledged investigation in that situation.
62
 However, the Pre-Trial Chamber underscored what it 
understood to be the Prosecutor’s obligation to proceed with timely preliminary 
examinations, regardless of their complexity. Arguably this same reasoning could apply to the 
need for the Prosecutor to carry out timely formal investigations.   
 
This issue of suspending rather than closing matters, arguably to avoid scrutiny by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber, has arisen in relation to a number of situations under formal investigation. For instance, in 
the Lubanga case, the Prosecutor had indicated that, despite the narrow indictment relating to the 
recruitment and enlistment of child soldiers, he was continuing to investigate other potential crimes.
63
 
However, in June 2006, the OTP informed the Pre-Trial Chamber that it had suspended its 
investigation into other crimes because of security concerns, but this does not exclude that it may 
continue the investigation into further crimes allegedly committed by Lubanga after the close of the 
proceedings.
64
 No new charges have subsequently been brought to the attention of the Pre-Trial 




In the Kenya II situation, the Prosecutor wrote to the Legal Representative for Victims and explained 
that ‘it has concluded that, in the absence of genuine cooperation from the Government, there is no 
immediate prospect of strengthening the evidence’.66  However, it refrained from formally closing the 
investigation and this statement of ‘suspension’ does not trigger the jurisdiction of the Court to inquire 
into those Prosecutorial actions (or non-actions). The Legal Representative for Victims in the Kenya 
II has put it thus:  
 
The Prosecution cannot be permitted to immunize itself against judicial review by, in effect, 
deciding not to proceed sine die and then (a) denying that it has decided not to proceed; and 
(b) claiming that its decision not to proceed is not based on the interests of justice. Rather, the 
Statute’s drafters appear to have intended the Prosecution either to rigorously and actively 
investigate and prosecute the cases before it until the conclusion of the trial or appeal, as 
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As the Central African Republic has argued, in some circumstances, the Prosecution’s lack of clear 
action can be interpreted constructively. The Kenya II legal representative for victims has made 
similar arguments:  
 
… the Chamber has discretion to review the Decision under article 53(3)(b) and rule 110(2) 
of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (‘Rules’). The only valid statutory basis for the 
Decision is either article 53(1)(c) (that further investigation ‘would not serve the interests of 
justice’) or article 53(2)(c) (that further prosecution ‘is not in the interests of justice’). That is, 
that the Prosecution de facto has decided not to proceed because it has concluded that further 





Or, as the Kenya II LRV has argued, the Pre-Trial Chamber should, in the face of lack of clear 
standards in the statute, and in light of the Court’s deterrent effect, cause there to be a judicial review 
as being the only thing ‘consistent with internationally recognized human rights’.69  
 
Another approach has been to seek to insulate the Prosecution’s decisions from review by specifying 
that, the assessment leading to the exercise of the prosecutor’s decision not to proceed, was based on a 
variety of considerations, and not only or mainly those relating to the ‘interests of justice’. As set out 
earlier, the Pre-Trial Chamber is only entitled to review on its own motion the exercise of the 
Prosecutor’s discretion not to proceed, when the Prosecutor’s decision is based solely on 
considerations relating to the ‘interests of justice’.70  
 
Indeed, even though considerations as to gravity are part and parcel of the factors to be assessed for an 
‘interests of justice’ based decision,71 the Prosecution has made clear in its decisions not to proceed 
with an investigation that it has considered gravity as part of the overall admissibility considerations 
under Article 17(1)(d). Yet as Ambos and Stegmiller have argued, there is a distinction between the 
gravity tests in Articles 17 and 53. The former is a minimum threshold consideration involving a legal 
determination of admissibility. The latter test introduces a discretionary element wherein a situation or 
case’s relative gravity is assessed against other criterions when considering which matters to take 
forward. As they argue,  
 
if gravity is used by the Prosecutor as a case selection and prioritization factor, it should be 
labelled accordingly, i.e., the OTP must reveal whether it uses gravity as a legal minimum 
threshold under article 17 (1) (d) ICC Statute or as a case selection criterion that involves 
discretionary considerations. If the latter is the case, as it appears from the strategy and policy 
papers, the OTP’s gravity determination is a matter of article 53 (2) (c) ICC Statute, subject to 
judicial control under article 53 (3) ICC Statute. As a consequence, any decision not to 
prosecute individuals based on discretionary determination of gravity – no matter whether the 
pending situation was triggered proprio motu, through a State referral or a Security Council 
referral – could be reviewed by the Chambers (footnotes omitted)72 
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 IV.4 Clamping Down on Victim Participation in the Pre-Trial Phase: Impact on the 
Impact of Justice 
Victims have a primary interest in ensuring that the Prosecutor undertakes full investigations that 
correspond with the nature, scale and gravity of the crimes. They can advocate for the Prosecution to 
responsibly implement its policy statements, and further encourage the Office to pursue lines of 
enquiry that relate to the most significant patterns of victimisation, which reflect both the magnitude 
of victimisation as well as their central characteristics, including the impact on particular categories of 
victims, such as women, children and other vulnerable groups. However, victims’ role during the 
investigation of a situation is extremely limited. The Appeals Chamber has held that victims cannot 
proceed generally during the investigation of a situation; they can participate in proceedings affecting 
investigations, provided that their personal interests are affected by the issues arising for resolution.
73
 
They have no standing before the Court to oblige the Prosecutor to pursue certain leads or to develop 
certain lines of prosecutorial enquiry, nor an ability to appeal a decision not to pursue certain lines of 
enquiry.  
In principle, victims with participatory rights in a particular case or situation could raise an issue 
concerning the exercise of the Prosecutor’s discretion not to proceed with an investigation or 
prosecution with the Pre-Trial Chamber. Indeed, as already described, the legal representative for 
victims recently did so in the Kenya II situation, though this invocation of the Pre-Trial Chamber was 
strongly contested by the Prosecution
74
 and at the time of writing, the Pre-Trial Chamber has yet to 
respond to the filing.
75
 The Prosecution was most concerned by the prospect that victims could trigger 
an ‘interests of justice’ review; ‘participants should not be permitted to circumvent the rules on 
standing by asserting a general right to request a Chamber to take action proprio motu. This would 
generally allow victims an open-ended right to make legal submissions on any topic in the absence of 
a judicial proceeding, provided those submissions are couched as a request for a Chamber to 
intervene.’76 But, the Chamber should not have its hands tied by a formulaic adherence to rules which 
were intended to be interpreted flexibly. After all, the purpose of victim participation is to enable 
victims’ views and concerns to be heard. 
 
However, in most other cases when victims’ interests have been affected by the exercise of the 
Prosecution’s discretion, this has been as a result of the failure of the Prosecution to seek 
authorization to commence an investigation (which engenders no procedural rights for victims 
whatsoever), or when the Prosecutor decides to proceed with charges which exclude the nature of 
particular victims’ suffering. In the latter example, only those ‘participating’ victims who fit within 
the existing situation or charges will be eligible for participatory rights, and it will naturally be those 
which fall outwith the charges that would have the strongest interest to encourage the Pre-Trial 
Chamber to carry out a review.
77
 This is a significant cap on victim participation, if the only victims 
who may participate are those which fit within the frame of the Prosecutor’s situation or case.  
 
In its 2013 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, the Prosecution makes clear that when 
considering the ‘interests of justice’ which statutorily obliges it to take into account victims’ interests, 
‘the Office will consider, in particular, the interests of victims, including the views expressed by the 
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victims themselves as well as by trusted representatives and other relevant actors such as community, 
religious, political or tribal leaders, States, and intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organisations.’78 Yet it is not clear what weight the Prosecutor will give to victims’ expressed interests 
or precisely how it would seek to engage with them. Enabling victims to engage directly with the Pre-
Trial Chamber so that their views and concerns can be independently known would seem to be a 
crucial way in which to safeguard their interests before the Court.    
V. Conclusions 
There are obvious challenges for the ICC to fulfil its mission to end impunity for the worst possible 
crimes and the Prosecution bears the main brunt of these challenges. Faced with massive criminality 
in most parts of the world, security constraints, minimal budgets and a lack of cooperation from many 
States, it is no wonder that the Office simply wants to get on with its work with the minimum amount 
of distractions and to the best of its ability. Its’ job is difficult enough without the distractions of 
needing to explain and account for its decisions, and on occasion, to have these reviewed by the Pre-
Trial Chamber.  
 
For the most part, the Pre-Trial Chamber has given extreme deference to the Prosecutor and has 
deflected most of the relatively few attempts made by victims and others to review the exercise of the 
Prosecutor’s discretion.  Victims can and have been side-lined from those issues that most concern 
them during the investigation stage. The Prosecutor’s choice of which situations to investigate and 
which charges to proffer directly impacts on whether and how their victimisation will be 
acknowledged and perceived, whether it will be recognised in their communities that they suffered a 
particular harm at the hands of a specific perpetrator and whether they will be eligible to participate 
and claim reparations.  
 
Stronger safeguards should be in place to ensure that prosecutorial discretion is exercised in 
accordance with the overarching goals of the Rome Statute. As McDonald and Haveman have 
underscored, there is a need to make what are largely subjective criteria, more objective.
79
 This is not 
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